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"ONE CHINA" POLICY WITH TAIWAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. 1 President George W. President Bush's observation that the U.S. will support any nation in the pursuit of liberty provides a sense of hope and opportunity to nations striving for recognized independence.
But for Taiwan, the President's pledge may seem somewhat hollow. For over three decades and six presidential administrations, the United States remains steadfast in its "One China Policy" to promote East Asia security. This One China Policy recognizes Taiwan as an informal sovereign democratic state, but legally it remains as part of China's recognized territorial boundaries. However, Taiwan's first democratically elected leader, President Chen Shui-bian, publicly requested formal international recognition apart from China. In a 3 August 2002 speech to the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations, President Chen emphasized that, "Each side is a country." 2 He went on to say that, "Taiwan is an independent sovereign state, that the Chinese communists are threatening Taiwan and suppressing its international role, and that only Taiwan's people have the right to decide its country's future." 3 For many reasons, Taiwan has prospered despite its long and perplexing cross-Strait existence. Indeed, Taiwan has benefited from strong U. S. economic, diplomatic, and military influence in its democratic transformation. Nonetheless, perhaps the United States should revisit its One China Policy and its commitment to Taiwan's security. Is the time right for a policy shift? Or, should current U.S. policy-makers successively pass the torch of diplomatic restraint to the next administration? Further exacerbating an already ambiguous One China Policy is the ambivalence between U.S. national interest and ideals towards the U.S./PRC/Taiwan triangular relationship. According to President Bush, freedom is nonnegotiable, and freedom has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states. 4 Is the U.S. concerns for freedom and democratic ideals being curtailed by its national interests, which generally take the form of economic, political, and military concerns? Under the One China Policy, the U.S. has steadfastly refused formal recognition of PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. The U.S. administration's informal political association with Taiwan seems to be placing diplomatic restraint on a country that wants nothing more but economic and political influence. The policy at issue, often referred to as one of "strategic ambiguity," has for decades sought to balance competing U.S. interest of both the PRC and Taiwan, and at the same time maintain peace and regional stability. 5 To fully explore the One China Policy legitimacy, this paper will define the policy through a review of current NSS. Specifically, this policy is reviewed to verify full implementation of U.S. NSS objectives, concepts, and resources. Additionally, this paper explores several U.S foreign policy options to consider in reshaping its policy towards China and Taiwan which include: maintain the status quo, adopt PRC's One China Two Systems (OCTS) policy, or support Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) request for independence. Each option is analyzed as to its inherent risks, or the gaps between what is desired, and the ways or resources available. Each option is also analyzed as to its feasibility, political acceptability, and suitability to attain the effect desired. Additionally, each option is then framed in terms of U.S interests. Lastly, this paper concludes with recommendations and a conclusion that support a change to the current NSS.
U.S. ONE CHINA POLICY REVIEW
Before delving into the nuances of current U.S foreign policy and the NSS, it is essential to understand the history surrounding the U.S. involvement in the U.S./ Taiwan nationalist party maintained that they ruled all of China and would some day resume control of the mainland. 6 In these years, Taiwan's sovereignty was unclear. It was argued that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which provided for Japan's surrender of Taiwan, left no ruler for the island nation. The treaty concluded that the future status of Taiwan would be decided in accordance with the principles of a United Nations (UN) charter. 7 However, it was not until 1971 that the UN presented a majority vote of the General Assembly to accord the PRC a seat both as a member of the General Assembly and Permanent Member of the Security Council. 8 In effect, the ROC-KMT seat in the UN as a representative of China was eliminated. Through the 1970's, most states came to accept the principle that there was but one China, a single entity embracing both Taiwan and the mainland. 9 In 1982, President Ronald Reagan, in keeping with the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué of President Nixon, clearly stated that the U.S. has no intention of interfering with Chinese sovereignty or China's territorial integrity. 10 15 This may be an indication the amorphous One China policy no longer supports the ends, ways, means, and risks of our current national strategy in Asia.
US POLICY OBJECTIVES (ENDS)
The regional U.S. objectives continue to promote stable and free democratic states, to ensure U.S. commitment to Taiwan security, and to communicate the U.S. opposition to any PRC use of force against Taiwan. However, achieving these objectives has challenged U.S. interests and ideals in the past. A 2003 International Crisis Group (ICG) 16 report noted that the period between 1970-1995 was considered a "Taiwan Strait Détente," a sustained relaxation of U.S. and PRC military confrontation. 17 According to the ICG, several factors contributed to this Cold War posture and policy. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and cooperation between PRC and the U.S. against the USSR were particularly important. The U.S. and PRC chose to overlook differences over Taiwan and concentrate on bringing down the Iron Curtain. But with the Soviet threat long gone dead, is there still a strategic rationale for supporting a One China policy?
According to Randall Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State For East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the U.S. has an interest in resolving cross-Strait differences; thus regional stability is a fundamental U.S. objective. 18 What complicates current U.S. foreign policy is the changed security environment since September 11, 2001 . 19 The U.S. immediately called on world leaders to help fight the war on terrorism, which included China's help. China is a country that the U.S. believes provided technology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to terrorist sponsoring states in the past. 20 However, during a visit to China in February 2002, President Bush met with former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and, regarding Taiwan, stressed the need for a peaceful cross-Strait settlement while pledging that the U.S. will adhere to the One China policy. 21 In strong terms, he encouraged them to follow the mandates of democracy, free expression, and human rights for the individual. Reinforcing President Bush's comments, the NSS also states that the U.S. must promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia Pacific where a democratic development of China is critical. 22 Thus the U.S. is clearly sending a message that it will persevere in developing democracies and ensuring political freedom in the Asian Pacific region.
However, the Bush Administration moved quickly and firmly to curb President's Chen's advocacy for a referendum on independence in August 2002, indicating that Chen's remarks were seen as provocative by many in the U.S. 23 In December 2003, the US sent a senior official on a quiet mission to Taiwan to urge President Chen hold off on a defense referendum designed to change Taiwan's status or to seek its independence if its sovereignty was under threat. 24 It is obvious that the U.S. leadership will continue to caution Taiwan not to press its luck when it comes to threatening U.S. interests by increasing tensions in U.S -PRC relations. U.S. interests are enhanced by an orderly, stable, peaceful, and secure Asia Pacific region that does not disrupt U.S., PRC, and Taiwan relations. The U.S. expects Taiwan to contribute to regional stability -not disrupt it. A senior Taiwanese government official also indicated President Chen's recent political moves were causing an even more acute wariness in his country about angering the U.S. by allowing any crisis to develop with China at a time when the Bush Administration is already preoccupied with Iraq and North Korea. 25 U.S. business interests, which include both trade and commerce, remain a powerful domestic force in promoting cross-Strait stability. Trade among the three countries is inextricably linked to their political and economic growth across many industries. President Bush's careful emphasis on maintaining mutually advantageous economic relations with China despite differences over other issues like human rights, missile defense, and weapons proliferation illustrate this important point in the triangular relationship. 26 In 2000, Taiwan -China trade increased 25.8 percent to 32.4 billion U.S dollars and about 17% of Taiwan's exports go to mainland China, which in fact was the largest single importer of Taiwan-made goods and services after the U.S. 27 In 2002, Taiwan -U.S. trade in goods amounted to 44.8 billion, or 18% of the total between Taiwan and the rest of the world -which is down from 25.6% a decade ago, primarily due to the draw of the Chinese market. 28 If trade interests are to be maintained, all parties need to operate much more visibly and vigorously in the positive domains of cross-Strait relations (trade, investment, direct links, exchanges, joint oil exploration, and fisheries ventures in the Taiwan Strait), and they must continue to refrain from any tendencies to provoke one another. 29 This positive capitalism, democratic reform, and free market systems conform to U.S interests and ideals.
US POLICY CONCEPT (WAYS)
To reassure Taiwan and deter China, America's commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act offered a formidable way to keep China from using military force against Taiwan. Signed into law on April 10, 1979, the U.S. created the TRA to find a way to protect its significant political, economic, and security interests on Taiwan in the wake of President Jimmy Carter's termination of diplomatic relations and a mutual defense treaty of 25 years. 30 The TRA was born of the U.S. decision to normalize relations with the PRC and recognize the government of Beijing as the sole legal government of all of China. The TRA asserted that the U.S. would oppose any effort to determine the future of Taiwan other than by peaceful means. 31 According to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Stanley Roth, the TRA officially serves several purposes to advance U.S interests: it helps to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; it promotes U.S. foreign policy by authorizing commercial, cultural, and other Taiwan -U.S. relations; it is the law; and, most importantly, because it enhances Taiwan's confidence to engage PRC. 32 The TRA serves not only as a tool for preventing use of force, but it also offers U.S. diplomacy as a likely alternative to direct military action. Assistant Secretary of State Roth also sees Taiwan's democratic transformation as a result of the TRA's protective umbrella. The TRA not only has secured a U.S. -Taiwan relationship, but it has contributed to some level of multilateral diplomacy between the U.S., Taiwan, and the PRC.
Other U.S. alternatives to maintain cross-Strait stability include active diplomacy, engagement to promote economic well being, and a direct informational campaign. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Shriver advocated these instruments when he declared that a secure and self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political interaction and dialogue with the PRC. 33 In the area of economic well being, U. S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay observed that Taiwan was our eighth largest trading partner in 2002. 34 foreign policy by quoting President Bush: "We have our best chance since the rise of the nationstate in the 17 th Century to build a world where the great powers compete in the peace instead of preparing for war." 37 Director Haass further elaborates on U.S policy as a process of integration in which the U.S. seeks to include other countries, organizations, and peoples in arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with the interests and values we and our partners share -values such as rule of law; opposition to terrorism and to the proliferation of WMD; limits on the power of the state; religious tolerance; private property rights; commitment to market principles; equal justice, and respect for women…these interests and values guide U.S policy toward China. 38 The resources specified by Director Haass that shape the One China policy may be less tangible, but they rhetorically demonstrate a commitment to countries promoting democracy.
But Assistant Secretary of State Shriver claims that the TRA obligation is to provide Taiwan with sufficient self-defense capability, noting that the U.S. administration accomplishes this with the sale of F-16's, frigates, helicopters, tanks, and a variety of defensive missiles. 39 Throughout the 1990's, most of Taiwan's new military equipment imports came from the U.S. While its defense spending has been reduced slightly from a decade ago, Taiwan's defense budget still amounted to an impressive US$7.57 billion in 2002. 40 According to the latest reports, at the encouragement of the U.S., Taiwan will, among other things, spend US$1.5 million on creating a C4ISR capability, which will enhance its missile, submarine, and other defenses, through enhanced integration of military systems. 41 Taiwan's significant defense acquisition and revolution in military capability should ensure that its armed forces are among the best in the region and serve to counter the PRC cross-Strait military threat, thereby stabilizing the region.
U.S. deterrent posture towards China in the Taiwan Strait has taken a number of other overt measures in terms of planning, deployments, and exercises in the area close to China.
These actions are specifically tied to its resolve to oppose Chinese rhetoric or use of force ideas and to prepare U.S forces for any cross-Strait contingencies. This is very obvious with carrier battle group exercises in the South China Sea; in carrier transits of the Taiwan Strait; in the extension of U.S.-Japan mutual support arrangements; and in rejuvenation of the military alliance with the Philippines. 42 In 2002, a senior U.S. commander noted that U.S. forces could make it very unattractive for China to conduct military aggression, and that the U.S. believes its Pacific-based forces are strong enough to resist and contain a Chinese attack on Taiwan. 43 
US ONE CHINA POLICY RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk includes the possibility of loss or damage in pursuit of a given policy or of not achieving an objective. 44 Deputy Under Secretary of State Shriver noted that the U.S. is careful to provide only weapons to Taiwan that are defensive in nature, so they will not destabilize the cross-Strait situation. 45 The U.S. clearly walks a tight rope to maintaining regional diplomatic, economic, and military stability. A PRC invasion of Taiwan may not be imminent, but we must remember that China did fire missiles off Taiwan's coast in 1996 -an incident that forced the U.S. to respond with a show of military force in the Straits. The One China policy depends on a fragile balance of cross-Strait options in support of U.S foreign policy of containing communism.
Clearly, the threat of war increases as China's military and force projection capabilities increase each passing year.
After the Bush Administration entered office, the media focused on the President's absence of high-level China experts with a 'lack of vision' about China. 46 In particular,
• China was seen a as a rising economic and military power, seeking to confront the United States over Taiwan and over time to ease the United States out of East Asia;
• China has opposed the U.S. support for Taiwan, and has given top military priority to dealing with the U.S in a Taiwan contingency;
• China also opposed the strengthening of the U.S. -Japan defense alliance and U.S missile defense plans; it worked against U.S interest in Asian and world affairs, in ASEAN Plus Three, the Shanghai Cooperation Group, the UN, and elsewhere. 47 Responding to these uncertainties, President Bush repeatedly endorsed the pursuit of a constructive, cooperative, and candid relationship with China. 48 as well as its preoccupation with its extensive leadership transition, may have sent Taiwan the wrong political signals. 52 As a result, PRC is accepting risk by resuming public threats to discourage any attempts of Taiwan to declare independence.
Economic
Close economic exchange has been essential to promoting a strong U.S. 55 Taiwan continues to show significant economic growth. Also in 2002, it even completed bilateral negotiations with the World Trade Organization. 56 Taiwan can enjoy this economic freedom primarily because it is protected by security arrangements under the TRA. In fact, supporting the status quo provided the necessary buffer to allow the three nations to prosper and enjoy substantial economic freedom in the region, a situation that is likely to continue. As President Bush states in the NSS, the path to economic freedom is not America's alone and the U.S. will ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade. 57
Military
The U.S. maintains a significant forward presence in the East Asia region, which contributes to Taiwan's stability and supports a status quo option. The 2003 ICG report noted U.S. military posture in the region has become an object of concern however to the Chinese leadership. 58 The ICG report points to two distinct phases in U.S. military support of Taiwan under the One China policy: an arms sales phase and a phase of restoration of normal alliance (2001) (2002) (2003) . In the first 20 years of the TRA, military sales represented little concern to China and were seen more as propaganda. However, the ICG report states that in It keeps Korea divided and thus more easily influenced by the PRC, and it prevents Japan -China chief Asian rival -from expanding its power in the region. It also prevents Taiwan from altering its status in ways inimical to Chinese interest and buys time for the mainland to persuade the Taiwanese to reunification. 59 It would appear that militarily, each nation is taking a cautious and yet calculated approach to ensuring a measured national security posture.
Feasibility, Acceptability, Suitability
If the U.S. maintains a status quo policy, Taiwan will continue to live under constant PRC rhetoric and threat of war, be subject to U.S. economic scrutiny, and live under an uncertain future of international recognition. This is in direct contradiction to the interests and ideals expressed in the NSS. 60 63 However, President Chen flatly rejects this PRC -Hong Kong reunification, stating explicitly that Taiwan is not a part of any other country, nor is it a local government or province of another country. 64 He goes on to declare that Taiwan can never be another Hong Kong because Taiwan has always been a sovereign state. The U.S. appears reluctant to endorse either position, since this would give the impression of choosing sides.
Diplomatic
Is Hong Kong's OCTS reunification with PRC a political success story that Taiwan should consider and the U.S. should support? Certainly the concept of OCTS was bold and untried anywhere else in the world. 65 Life in Hong Kong under Chinese rule, at first glimpse, appears to be just the same. This continuity may be due to the basic agreement in the reunification pact that stipulates that the previous systems and Hong Kong way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years. This set in place five decades of delay for which PRC promised to ensure a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. In the negotiations that led up to the handover, Great
Britain and PRC both hoped that this long period would be enough time to defuse a ticking time bomb. 66 The territory would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs, and
China's socialist system and policies will not be practiced the SAR.
Unfortunately, there is evidence that the Hong Kong government is not independent of Chinese influence. In fact, the erosion of the foundation of Hong Kong as a free society with a vibrant and highly competitive economy backed by the rule of law has certainly started. 67 
Steve
Tsang, Director of the Asian Studies Center, Oxford University, notes,
The best-known one involves the right of abode in the SAR for children born out of wedlock. In this, as in other cases…the problems that emerged do not concern the independence of the judicial branch. On this occasion, the appeal process ended with the Court of Final Appeal deciding in early 1999 in favor of the children and against the wish of the SAR government. This ruling was subverted, and the Court of Final Appeal was later forced to reverse itself after the chief executive invited the Chinese National People's Congress to reinterpret the Basic Law in order to deny the right of abode to the children concerned and make this effective retroactive. 68 Tsang further mentions that this process can only be slowed or even stopped by the international community paying close attention to these incidents and the people of Hong Kong persuade Beijing to not meddle in its rule of law.
An article from the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, DC states that China continues to ignore Taiwan's political reality and democratic development. 69 press for an end to its international isolation even at the risk of increased tension with China. About 70 percent were against the 'one country, two systems' concept. 79 Thus, given Taiwan's total opposition to OCTS and its threat to the U.S. interests of stability in the region, the OCTS alternative appears too untenable for a U.S administration to support. 80 If Taiwan opts for OCTS, they put their whole democratic framework at risk to the PRC authoritarian ways interested in selfpreservation and political hegemony, thereby losing economic partnership and international parity. Obviously, no one wants to see war break out over Taiwan with the PRC-US on either side.
That said, should the U.S. fully back the Taiwanese President's efforts for a referendum on independence? According to the NSS, a quarter of a century after beginning the process of shedding the worst features of the communist legacy, China's leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state. In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. 81 The U.S. keeps close tabs on PRC modernization of its armed forces, and elements of this modernization is making the U.S. and U.S. partners in the Asia Pacific region feel less secure.
Diplomatic
Even in its own NSS, the U.S. is critical of PRC's proliferation of military activities and lack of political reform. Conversely, the Taiwanese people enjoy freedom and are not resistant to a formal declaration of independence, but they realize the risks inherent with deviation from traditional values. This ambiguity amongst the people is shown in polls conducted by Taipei's Through nearly five decades of hard work and sound economic management, Taiwan has transformed itself from an underdeveloped, agricultural island to an economic power that is a leading producer of high-technology goods. Taiwan is now a creditor economy, holding one of the world's largest foreign exchange reserves of more than $100 billion in 1999. Despite the Asian financial crisis, the economy continues to expand at about 5% per year, with virtually full employment and low inflation. The population also enjoys an annual average income equal to U.S$ 13,152 (1999) . 86 However, as mentioned earlier, with such interdependence with China for trade and investment, the movement to independence would possibly cause a radically shift in Taiwan's economic trade strategy. According to political scientist David Denoon, We see that Taiwan has concentrated both its trade and its investment plans on China. This focus entails three kinds of risks: (a) having an unbalanced portfolio that could suffer if China's economy turns sour; (b) reinforcing the asymmetry in constituent groups, leading businessmen on Taiwan to press for concessions to China, where there is no comparable group; and (c) assisting the Chinese economy through capital and technology transfers when there is no comparable return flow. 87 From a purely economic perspective, Taiwan appears to have shifted its investment focus. Its economic partnership with PRC and the U.S. continues with promising growth potential.
However, its complex relationship with PRC must be thrown into the equation, which skews the economic formula. Again, in its pursuit of independence, it is likely Taiwan will suffer PRC consequences.
Military
Taiwan's armed forces have been reformed in recent years to bring them in line with democratic reforms and civilian control, while never losing sight of their primary mission, guarding against a possible invasion from the PRC. 88 Over the last decade, Taiwan has secured its place in modernizing its armed forces by moving to number two in the world for arms imports and 15 th as the world's largest military force. 89 Taiwan's military evolution in the past decade is inextricably linked to changes in the political landscape. Taiwan is in the process of adopting a revolution in military affairs, which will change its strategy for future security.
Taiwan's defense strategy has evolved from a counterattack strategy up to the 1960s to an offensive-defensive strategy up to the 1980s, to a purely defensive strategy up to the present.
Currently Taiwan's strategist are contemplating an active defense whereby the objective would be to ensure that any conflict with PRC will be fought as far away from Taiwan's shores as possible. 90 However, a move towards independence would present a formidable military risk to this island nation.
In April 2001, and much to the consternation of the PRC, the United States also agreed to sell Taiwan eight diesel power submarines, four mothballed Kidd class destroyers, instead of the Aegis destroyers that Taiwan had been requesting, P3 Orion maritime surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. Taiwan is also believed to have purchased Patriot 3 SAMS from the United States and has expressed an interest in buying Apache attack helicopters. The acquisition of these new capabilities should help the island counter the growing and well-documented challenge posed by the PRC. 91 As stated above, the evolution of Taiwan's military might pose a significant threat to any attempt by PRC use of force. However, Taiwan also realizes that confidence in its security is only Nonetheless, PRC is becoming an increasingly capable military force that over time will be able to project substantial power off its shores . 95 In December 2003, Senior PRC military officers warned that Taiwan was facing the abyss of war declaring that PRC would accept boycotts of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, reduced foreign investment, and military casualties to prevent any Taiwanese move to advance independence. 96 To subdue this awareness, the U.S. will likely continue its NSS regional engagement initiatives to protect its interests under the TRA. U.S. policy is to build an environment in which open cross-Strait dialogue is peaceful and which reduces such political tension.
POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The forgoing foreign policy review indicates the need for a more deliberate U.S. policy for Taiwan. We can no longer rely on the tenuous One China policy. First, the U.S. should consider its own National Security Strategy when deciding whether to formally recognize support for the current Taiwanese government's move towards independence. The NSS states the U.S. will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. 97 The U.S. already sent a message to both the world and to China in 1996 that any PRC attempt to unify with Taiwan by force will be countered with U.S. military might. President Bush applied his plainspoken political approach to Taiwan when he responded with the infamous, "Yes, whatever it takes," comment on what it would take to defend the island. The U.S. should now recognize Taiwan in its NSS as a successful democratic nation and continue to provide its security, as it has for over two decades. The time has come to develop a more formal US-Taiwan relationship, especially if the Taiwanese substantially vote yes to any referendums on independence.
Second, the U.S. should continue its bi-lateral support of the 1979 TRA. The shelter of the TRA, entrusted by each successive U.S administration, helped to make Taiwan's transition to democracy successful. Providing Taiwan with planes, ships, tanks as well as defensive missiles offers an example for other sovereign nation-states to promote democracy and regional security. The U.S. should continue this commitment to ensure Taiwan builds not only confidence in its security, but develops a sufficient self defense capability to secure its borders.
Finally, the U.S. must keep all elements of national power (military, economic, informational, and political) focused on the PRC. This deliberate action will help secure Asian economic growth, broaden access to foreign markets, and discourage further spread of communism. PRC's advocacy of OCTS will not work in Taiwan because the Taiwanese reject it; Taiwan is not Hong Kong. According to Jamestown Foundation's Stockwin, when Deng Xiooping created OCTS, it was a different Taiwan from the one that exists today. Then, an unreformed cadre of Kuomintang Nationalist ruled Taiwan and both China and Taiwan were authoritarian political systems. 98 Today, Taiwan is a democracy.
There is much ambiguity in the One China policy. Researching U.S. policy statements, congressional reports, and political commentaries reveals that the U.S. successfully pursued this Sino-American approach to foreign relations with incredible political savvy. The current U.S. ends, ways, and means for supporting a One China policy are not specified clearly enough to achieve the 2002 NSS objectives. The U.S. One China policy has potentially outlived its intended use. It does not fully support current U.S. regional objectives and a U.S Presidential Administration focused on establishment and preservation of democracy. U.S. national values may equal U.S. national policy, but together they do not offer collective agreement between Taiwan and the PRC. Under current U.S. strategy, it appears the U.S. will not alter its relationship with Beijing with the hope that the PRC will eventually evolve into a democratic state. For strategists, hope is not a method.
CONCLUSION
U.S. pursuit of a One China policy was successful for almost two decades. Amazingly, by pursuing the status quo, we averted direct confrontation. However, the evolving Asian strategic environment calls this status quo policy's usefulness into question. Taiwan' s President Chen
Shui-bian argues that Taiwan maintains all the characteristics of a state and that it has not been replaced or succeeded by the PRC. The U.S. and the UN must recognize the legitimacy of developing democracies like Taiwan and not hinder their efforts to become sovereign nations.
The U.S/Taiwan/PRC triangular relations have arrived at a sensitive time, with elections in the both U.S. and Taiwan in 2004 and new PRC leadership. For the immediate future, the current status quo policy offers the suitable solution until the U.S has stabilized from its engagement across many global hot spots. However, the ideals stated in the U.S. National Security Strategy are designed to foster a strategic environment conducive to regional peace and stability. Thus, the U.S. must stand firm on promoting democracy directed at both Taiwan and the PRC. The U.S should recognize this fact with strong policy language supported by a strategy with clear objectives, and favor a formal declaration of independence should the Taiwanese vote on such a referendum. This implies that America may come into conflict with China under its obligations in the TRA. Regrettable as it may be, defending core values and ideals is the price of promoting freedom in an increasingly democratic world. Alternatively, if the U.S. administration is not willing to back up its position of freedom across the globe, then change the NSS. To ignore or underestimate the significance of this issue or to ignore the ambiguity of a One China, falls short in successfully employing all U.S. elements of national power.
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